

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.1756 of 2022**

Arising Out of PS. Case No.-35 Year-2020 Thana- MAHILA P.S. District- Muzaffarpur

Om Prakash Paswan @ Ram Prakash Paswan, S/o Late Chaudhary Paswan,
R/o village- Muradpur Dullah, P.S.- Ahiyapur, District- Muzaffarpur.

... .. Appellant/s

Versus

The State of Bihar

... .. Respondent/s

Appearance :

For the Appellant/s	:	Mr. Sunil Kumar Verma, Adv. Ms. Suman Kumar Verma, Adv.
For the State	:	Mr. Syed Ashfaque Ahmad, APP

**CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAILENDRA SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT**

Date : 03-08-2026

Heard Mr. Sunil Kumar Verma, learned counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Syed Ashfaque Ahmad, learned APP
for the State.

2. The instant appeal has been preferred against the
judgment of conviction dated 28.02.2022 and the consequent
order of sentence dated 02.03.2022 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-7th-cum-Spl Judge, POCSO Act,
Muzaffarpur, in connection with G.R. No. 54 of 2020 arising out
of Mahila P.S. Case No. 35 of 2020, whereby and whereunder
the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable
under Sections 8 & 10 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act (in short, 'POCSO Act'). The appellant has
been sentenced to undergo five (5) years of rigorous



imprisonment for the offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand). He has been further sentenced to undergo five (5) years of rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 10 of the POCSO Act with a fine of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand). Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. Thus, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo a total period of five (5) years of rigorous imprisonment and pay a total fine of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) and in default of payment of the fine amount, he has been directed to undergo an additional one (1) year of rigorous imprisonment.

Prosecution Story :

3. On the evening of July 3, 2020, ten-year-old XXX (victim), daughter of YYYY, who lives near Zero Mile under Ahiyapur police station, was told by her grandfather, Om Prakash Paswan, that he would take her to the market to buy sweets. Trusting him, she went with her grandfather, but instead of taking her to the market, he took her to his house in the Mithanpura area and made her swear an oath that she would never tell her mother and father anything about what he was going to do with her. After that, he kissed her, forced himself upon her, opened her underwear and licked her private parts.



After that she screamed and somehow managed to run away from the house, entering a stranger's home where she narrated her personal incident to an aunt who told her to stay there until her parents came looking for her. Thereafter, when her mother and father arrived at the aunt's house searching for her, she (victim) told them everything that had happened with her.

4. The informant gave her written application on 05.07.2020 at about 06:50 P.M. to the SHO Neem Kumari of Mahila Police Station, Muzaffarpur. Upon that basis, a formal FIR bearing Mahila P.S. Case No. 35 of 2020 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 354, 354(B) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, 'IPC') and Sections 4, 6, 8 & 10 of the POCSO Act, thereby setting the criminal law in motion.

5. Upon completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted Chargesheet No. 60/20 dated 28.10.2020, against the appellant under Sections 341, 342, 354, 354(B) and 506 of the IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

6. Learned Magistrate took cognizance against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 354, 354(B) and 506 of the IPC and Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of



the POCSO Act. After taking cognizance of the alleged offences, the learned Magistrate committed the case of the appellant to the Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, for trial. The appellant stood charged for the offences under Sections 341, 342, 354, 354(B) and 506 of the IPC and Sections 4, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act. The said charges were read over and explained in Hindi to the appellant by the trial court, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether nine witnesses who are as under :-

Rank	Name	Nature of Evidence
PW-1	XXX	Victim
PW-2	YYY	A witness of circumstance (mother of the victim)
PW-3	ZZZ	A witness of circumstance (father of the victim)
PW-4	Chandrika Kumar Paswan	A witness of circumstance
PW-5	Lalbabu Rai	A witness of circumstance
PW-6	Dr. Rashmi Raginee	Medical Specialist
PW-7	Jaymant Devi	A witness of circumstance
PW-8	Chanchala Devi	A witness of circumstance
PW-9	Samvedna Snehi	Investigating officer

8. In addition to the above mentioned ocular evidence, the prosecution proved and exhibited the following documents in documentary evidence :-

Sl. No	Exhibit No.	Description	Proved by/Attested by
1.	Ext-1	Written application of the victim	PW-1



2.	Ext-02	Medical examination report of the victim with the signature of the Medical officer	PW-6
3.	Ext-03	Requisition to Pathology Department for microscopic examination for the presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab and smear of the victim	PW-6
4.	Ext-04	Supplementary report of microscopic examination of vaginal swab and smear of the victim	PW-6
5.	Ext-5	Endorsement of the SHO on the written application of the victim	SHO
6.	Ext-6	Signature of SHO on the FIR	SHO
7.	Ext-7	Signature of the SHO on C.S.	PW-9
8.	Ext-8	Statement of the mother of the victim u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C.	PW-2
9.	Ext-9	Victim statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C.	PW-1

9. After the completion of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) by the trial court. The appellant denied the material circumstances appearing against him from the prosecution evidences and submitted that the case was falsely registered against him due to land dispute and the appellant pleaded himself to be innocent.

10. During the trial, the appellant examined one defence witness who is as under :-

Sl. No.	Name	Nature of Evidence
DW-1	Kriti Kumari	Character witness

11. In addition to the above mentioned ocular defence evidence, the appellant produced and exhibited the



following documents in documentary evidence :

Sl. No.	Exhibit No.	Description
1.	Ext -A	Exercise book of the victim
2.	Ext -B	Signature of the mother of the victim on the application for medical examination of the victim
3.	Ext -C	Photocopy of Aadhaar Card of victim
4.	Ext -C/1	Certified copy of an informatory petition dated 22.07.2011
5.	Ext -D1	Sale deed dated 11.09.2004
6.	Ext -D	Sale deed dated 04.02.2010

12. While convicting the appellant for the offences under Sections 8 & 10 of the POCSO Act, the learned trial court mainly placed reliance upon the evidence of the victim herself as well as her statement recorded during the course of investigation under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. and her evidence was taken as fully corroborative to her allegations levelled by her in the FIR.

13. As regards the victim's age at the time of the alleged occurrence, the trial court observed in the impugned judgment that the victim was aged 11 years and 4 months on the date of the alleged occurrence, i.e., below 12 years of age.

Consideration and Analysis :-

14. I have heard both the sides, perused the judgment impugned and the evidences adduced by both the sides and the appellant’s statement made by him under Section



313 of the Cr.P.C.

15. The appellant, who happens to be the victim's own grandfather, was prosecuted on the allegation that, being a blood relative of the victim and residing with her in the same household, he committed sexual assault upon her. The trial court found that the appellant's act constituted aggravated sexual assault upon the victim and, accordingly, convicted him for the offences punishable under Sections 8 and 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

16. The prosecution case, in substance, is that on the evening of 03.07.2020, the appellant persuaded the victim to accompany him to the market on the pretext of buying her sweets. However, instead of taking her to the market, he took her to another house belonging to him situated at Mithanpura. There, he first made the victim swear that she would not disclose what was about to happen. Thereafter, he started kissing her, removed her lower garment and started licking her genital area. The victim somehow managed to escape from the appellant's house and ran, in a distressed and crying condition, to the house of an unknown lady. She narrated the occurrence to the said lady, who consoled her and advised her to accompany her parents when they arrived. Thereafter, the victim's parents



came to the said house and took her home, whereupon she disclosed the entire incident to them.

17. The victim was examined before the trial court as PW-1. Prior thereto, she had recorded her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 08.07.2020, merely three days after the registration of the FIR, which was marked as Exhibit-9. In her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., she remained substantially consistent with her allegations. Although she did not fully describe the manner of the assault in the said statement and there are some discrepancies between her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. and the version narrated in the FIR, the material particulars of the occurrence, as described in the FIR, remain substantially consistent. Before the trial court, she deposed that the alleged occurrence took place on 03.07.2020. According to her testimony, on that day, her grandfather (the appellant) took her to Mithanpura on the pretext of buying her sweets, made her swear that she would not disclose what was about to happen, kissed her, removed her clothes and thereafter started licking her private parts. She further deposed that, on the pretext of drinking water, she managed to open the gate, escaped from the house and took shelter in a nearby hut where a lady was present,



to whom she narrated the occurrence.

18. The victim was subjected to a lengthy cross-examination on the material facts forming part of the prosecution case. Upon careful scrutiny of her evidence, I do not find any material contradiction between her testimony before the trial court and the prosecution case as narrated in the FIR. During her cross-examination, she remained consistent in her allegation that the appellant had committed sexual assault upon her.

18.1. Insofar as the subsequent conduct of the victim, such as, her escape from the appellant's custody and her taking shelter in the house of a lady, is concerned, the testimonies of PW-5, PW-7 and PW-8 assume considerable significance. It was at their house that the victim first took shelter after escaping from the appellant and disclosed the occurrence. Although there are some discrepancies between the testimony of the victim and those of PW-5, PW-7 and PW-8 regarding the extent of the disclosure made by the victim, however, they consistently deposed that the victim came to their house in a bewildered and weeping condition at or about the time immediately after the alleged occurrence. To that extent, their evidence corroborates the subsequent conduct of the victim



and lends support to the prosecution case.

18.2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently contended that PW-5 admitted during his evidence that he did not previously know the victim's father. However, before the trial court, he claimed to have identified the appellant after seeing him through WhatsApp which, according to the learned counsel, casts serious doubt upon the credibility of his testimony. The said contention, however, does not appear to have much substance. The alleged occurrence took place on 03.07.2020, whereas PW-5 was examined before the trial court on 24.11.2021, more than one year after the occurrence. It is also an admitted position that the house of PW-5 is situated about 1-1.5 kilometres away from the victim's parental home. During his cross-examination, PW-5 deposed that on the date of the alleged occurrence he met the victim's mother when they came to his house. Thus, before his evidence was recorded, he had become acquainted with the victim's family, of which the appellant is also a member. Therefore, the fact that PW-5 identified the appellant after having seen him through WhatsApp does not, by itself, render his testimony unreliable.

18.3. Although PW-5, PW-7 and PW-8 are not eyewitnesses to the commission of the alleged offence, their



evidence regarding the events immediately following the occurrence, particularly the victim's conduct after escaping from the appellant and her distressed condition, is relevant and lends corroboration to the prosecution case.

19. I shall now deal with the other aspects of the prosecution case. The FIR in the present case was lodged by the victim herself on 05.07.2020 by submitting a written application. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that there was an unexplained and inordinate delay on the part of the victim and her parents in initiating legal proceedings against the appellant.

19.1. It is true that there was a delay of two days in lodging the FIR with regard to the alleged commission of the sexual assault. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, such delay does not appear to be fatal to the prosecution. The appellant is the victim's own grandfather and was residing in the same household. The allegation pertains to the commission of sexual assault by a close family member. In such circumstances, where the accused and the victim reside together and share a close familial relationship, there may be several reasons, including familial pressure or other compelling circumstances, for not initiating legal proceedings immediately.



In this regard, the evidence of the victim's parents, examined as PW-2 and PW-3, could have been relevant had they been questioned on this aspect. However, neither the victim nor her parents was cross-examined regarding the delay in lodging the FIR. Moreover, in cases involving allegations of sexual assault committed by a close family member against a minor victim, such delay, by itself, cannot be made a ground to disbelieve the victim's allegations.

20. Before the trial court, the appellant primarily took the defence that on account of a land dispute, he had been falsely implicated in the present case. His statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is relevant in this regard. In the light of the said defence, I have carefully examined the testimony of the victim and her parents to ascertain whether there is any substance in the appellant's plea or not. The victim categorically deposed during her cross-examination that there was no dispute between her father and the appellant with regard to partition and that all the family members were residing together in the same house. She further stated in paragraph No. 17 of her deposition that there was no dispute whatsoever between her father and the appellant.

20.1. PW-3, who is the father of the victim, did not



depose anything in his evidence to indicate that there existed any strained relationship between him and the appellant prior to the alleged occurrence. Rather, during his cross-examination, he specifically stated that he had not instituted any case against his father claiming a share in the partition of the family property. Upon a careful consideration of the evidence of PW-3 as well as that of PW-2, the victim's mother, I do not find any circumstance suggesting that the victim's parents had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant by levelling such a grave allegation of sexual assault involving their daughter.

21. It is true that, in support of his defence, the appellant produced Ext.-C/1, Ext.-D and Ext.-D1, comprising an informatory petition and certain registered sale deeds. However, these documents were either filed or executed several years prior to the alleged occurrence. Even if the contents of the informatory petition are accepted, they merely indicate that a partition dispute had arisen in the year 2011 between the appellant and the victim's father. Thereafter, several years elapsed, during which the appellant, the victim, her parents and the other family members continued to reside together in the same house until the date of the alleged occurrence. In such circumstances, the existence of a partition dispute nearly nine



years prior to the alleged occurrence cannot, by itself, cast any doubt upon the credibility of the prosecution case.

21.1. Insofar as Ext. -D1, the certified copy of a sale deed is concerned, it merely evidences a transfer of land between the appellant and one Shail Devi. The said document neither reflects any strained relationship between the appellant and the victim's parents nor lends support to the defence set up by the appellant. Moreover, the sale deed was executed in the year 2004, nearly sixteen years before the alleged occurrence. Therefore, the said document is of little evidentiary value in substantiating the appellant's plea of false implication.

22. Learned counsel for the appellant, placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in ***Raushan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar*** (Cr. App. (DB) No. 262 of 2022) along with the analogous case, has vehemently contended that the age of the victim was not determined in accordance with law and that the trial court failed to record any finding regarding the victim's minority in the light of the provisions of Section 94(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. It has been submitted that in the absence of any finding regarding the victim's age so as to establish that she was a minor on the date



of the alleged occurrence, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act cannot be sustained in law. According to the learned counsel, the prosecution has failed to establish that the victim was a "child" within the meaning of the POCSO Act.

23. I have carefully considered the aforesaid submission and examined the evidence available on record as well as the impugned judgment. I do not find any merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. It is true that Section 34 of the POCSO Act provides that whenever a question arises as to whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court. However, where no dispute regarding the age of the victim is raised before the trial court/Special Court and the victim apparently appears to be a minor, there would be no occasion to undertake an inquiry under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 for determination of the victim's age. In support of above contention, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the observations contained in paragraph 24 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in ***Raushan Kumar (supra)***. For ready reference, paragraph 24 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“24. A question arises in the



present case as to whether the age of the victim was at all in dispute or not for the purpose of attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act. We are mindful of the position that if a person appears to be a child to the court upon mere appearance requiring no further determination, no exercise may be required to be undertaken for determination of age of such person. Section 94(1) of the J.J. Act, 2015 stipulates that where it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of the said Act that the person is a child, the committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry without waiting for further confirmation of the age. That is not the situation in the present case, as the opinion of the trial court that the victim was a child within the meaning of the provisions of the POCSO Act is not based on the obvious appearance of the victim, rather the same is largely based on the Doctor's opinion on analysis of radiological examination. We hold without any demur that the course adopted by the trial court holding the victim to be a child to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act was legally impermissible in view of the law clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh (supra).”

24. At this juncture, I would like to refer the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of



Sushil Kumar Tiwari vs. Hare Ram Sah & Ors., reported in 2025 INSC 1061 and the relevant paragraph No. 17 of the said judgment is being reproduced for ready reference :

“17. It cannot be denied that there are slight variations in the age of the victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from the oral and documentary evidence. However, we do not find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the age was not proved during trial. The oral testimonies of PW-3, PW-5 and PW-6 are consistent inter-se as well as with the Transfer Certificate issued by the government school. The age of the victim appears to be within the range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time. The medical report records the age as 15 years. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the age of the victim was not challenged during cross-examination of any of the witnesses mentioned above. Their testimonies, on the point of age, have largely remained unrebutted, thereby meaning that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had no claim that she was not a minor at the relevant point. We do not mean to say in cases involving POCSO Act or Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015, the determination of age is not required. Most certainly, the determination of minority is essential to extend the protection of these legislations, however, as long as the age conclusively appears to be under 18 years, the special protections carved out in favour of children cannot be diluted by insisting upon a



rigid determination of the age, that too when it was not even questioned at the right time. In the present case, even if it is believed that the age of the victim was not determined to the hilt, the Trial Court had concluded that the victim was aged between 12 to 15 years at the relevant point of time and thus, was a minor. Thus, it could not be stated that the Trial Court had not determined the minority of the victim. It was done and, in our opinion, rightly so, on the basis of the unrebutted oral and documentary evidence.”

25. The aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. During the cross-examination of the victim as well as of her parents before the trial court, no dispute whatsoever was raised by the appellant with regard to the age of the victim. Consequently, the age of the victim, as disclosed by her and corroborated by her parents, remained unrebutted. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides that where it is apparent to the Committee or the Board, on the basis of the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of the Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence), that such person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation regarding the age of the child, as nearly as may be, and proceed with the



inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36 of the Act, as the case may be, without awaiting further confirmation of age. The procedure prescribed under Section 94 is required to be followed only where the determination of the age of a child becomes necessary. In this regard, the observations made by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in ***Raushan Kumar (supra)*** are relevant. The provisions of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act clearly contemplate that the process of age determination is to be undertaken only where there exist reasonable grounds for doubting whether the person concerned is a child. In the present case, the victim herself disclosed her age as 10 years in the written FIR lodged by her. In her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate assessed her age to be about 9 years. Thereafter, while deposing before the trial court, the victim disclosed her age as 11 years and the trial court also assessed her age to be 11 years.

26. The victim's mother, who was examined as PW-2, stated in paragraph No. 17 of her cross-examination that her another daughter, who was elder to the victim, was studying in Class VII. From this evidence, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim was studying either in Class VII or in a class below it



at the time of the alleged occurrence. Thus, throughout the course of the trial, the fact that the victim was below 18 years of age never remained in dispute. Even at the stage of recording the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant did not dispute either the age or the minority of the victim. Had the appellant questioned the age of the victim or disputed her minority being at the time of the alleged occurrence, the trial court would have been required to undertake the process of age determination in accordance with law. In the absence of any such dispute, however, there was no occasion for the trial court to initiate such an inquiry. Moreover, the medical examination report of the victim (Exhibit-02) records that her breasts were not developed and that axillary and pubic hair were absent. These medical findings also constitute relevant circumstances supporting the prosecution's case regarding the victim's minority. In this regard, the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in ***Jai Kumar @ Jai Prakash (Cr. App. (SJ) No. 608 of 2015)*** and analogous cases, relied upon by the learned APP, are relevant.

27. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently contended that the handwriting appearing on the written FIR, purportedly authored by the victim, is entirely



different from the admitted handwriting of the victim as reflected in her exercise book, which was produced by the defence and marked as Exhibit-'A'. On that basis, it has been argued that the written FIR was not authored by the victim but by some other person and the victim falsely projected herself as the author of the written report presented before the police. According to the learned counsel, the trial court failed to properly appreciate this aspect of the matter and therefore, the entire prosecution case founded upon the FIR becomes highly doubtful and suspicious.

27.1. Insofar as the aforesaid contention relating to the alleged difference in the handwriting appearing on the written FIR (Exhibit-1) and the victim's exercise book (Exhibit-'A') is concerned, the trial court dealt with the issue in paragraph No. 14 of the impugned judgment. The trial court observed that, upon the appellant's prayer for comparison of the handwriting in question by a handwriting expert, an order dated 24.01.2022 was passed holding that such comparison was not feasible. The trial court further observed that the handwriting of a child ordinarily undergoes changes with the passage of time. A perusal of Exhibit-'A' also reveals that the exercise book does not indicate the class in which the victim was studying.



Furthermore, had the FIR actually been written by a person other than the victim and lodged on her behalf, material contradictions would ordinarily have surfaced during her testimony. However, despite extensive cross-examination with reference to the contents of the FIR as well as her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., no such contradiction has emerged. On the contrary, her testimony remained substantially consistent with the contents of the written FIR and her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., thereby supporting the prosecution case and sufficiently establishing that the FIR was, in fact, lodged by the victim herself.

28. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the prosecution has successfully established the foundational facts constituting the alleged offence of aggravated sexual assault. Consequently, the statutory presumption available under the provisions of the POCSO Act became operative against the appellant. The burden, therefore, shifted upon the appellant to rebut the said presumption, which he has failed to discharge. Further, the manner in which the appellant allegedly committed the offence against his own granddaughter clearly attracts the presumption regarding the existence of the requisite culpable mental state of the appellant



and the prosecution was, therefore, entitled to invoke the statutory presumption in that regard as well.

29. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has successfully proved that the appellant committed aggravated sexual assault, as defined under Section 9 of the POCSO Act, upon his own granddaughter. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the close relationship between the victim and the appellant, the delay of two days in lodging the FIR does not assume such significance as to discredit the prosecution case. Further, this Court finds no reason to accept the appellant's plea that the victim was intentionally used by her parents to settle a family partition dispute. The evidence on record does not support such a defence. Likewise, no dispute regarding the victim's age or minority was ever raised before the trial court and the prosecution's assertion that the victim was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged occurrence remained unrebutted throughout the trial. Accordingly, the approach adopted by the trial court in convicting the appellant under Sections 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act is found to be proper, legal and well-founded. This Court, therefore, finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction



and the order of sentence. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.

30. Let the records of the trial court, along with a copy of this judgment, be transmitted forthwith to the trial court for needful and necessary compliance.

(Shailendra Singh, J)

annu/-

AFR/NAFR	AFR
CAV DATE	NA
Uploading Date	10.08.2026
Transmission Date	10.08.2026

